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constitutes one of 
the most crucial chal-
lenges of the new mil-
lennium. To meet that 
challenge, reliable informa-
tion is essential. Juvenile Offend-
ers and Victims: 1999 National 
Report offers a comprehensive 
overview of these pervasive problems 
and the response of the juvenile justice 
system. The National Report brings 
together statistics from a variety of sources 
on a wide array of topics, presenting the 
information in clear, nontechnical text 
enhanced by more than 350 easy-to-read 
tables, graphs, and maps. 
This Bulletin series is designed to give readers 
quick, focused access to some of the most critical 
findings from the wealth of data in the National Report. 
Each Bulletin in the series highlights selected themes 
at the forefront of juvenile justice policymaking and 
extracts relevant National Report sections (including 
selected graphs and tables). 
Administrator's Message 
In 1899, when the first proceeding of a juvenile court 
convened in Chicago, it is unlikely that those in the 
courtroom were aware of the momentous impact of 
their actions. Yet, that beginning provided the foun-
dation for how our Nation deals with juvenile offenders. 
A century ago, the focus of the juvenile justice system 
was on the juvenile offender-rather than the offense--
and that remains largely true today. The juvenile 
court system is based on the principle that youth are 
developmentally different from adults and more 
amenable to intervention. At its best, the juvenile 
court balances rehabilitation and treatment with 
appropriate sanctions-including incarceration, 
when necessary. 
The Illinois statute also gave the court jurisdiction 
over dependent, neglected, and delinquent children. 
This understanding of the link between child victim-
ization, family disorder, and the potential for child 
victims to become offenders without early and 
effective intervention continues to be an important 
part of the juvenile court philosophy. 
This Bulletin provides a thorough, easily understood 
description of the development of the juvenile justice 
system in the United States. It also uses the most 
current data available to look at where we are headed, 
and it examines the recent trend of transferring certain 
juvenile cases to adult criminal court. 
Contrary to what some people believe, today's U.S. 
juvenile justice system is not an "easy out" that gives 
a meaningless slap on the wrist to violent youth. Nor 
is it a breeding ground for gangs, drugs, and adult 
crime. Instead, the juvenile justice system provides 
youthful offenders and their victims with a compre-
hensive, yet balanced approach to justice. Probation, 
treatment, and restitution are widely used. For most 
juveniles who enter the system, this approach works: 
54 percent of males and 73 percent of females never 
return to juvenile court on a new referral. 
Certainly, there are areas in the juvenile justice system 
that need improvement. For example, the system 
needs to prepare to handle more female offenders and 
offenders under the age of 13, two groups whose 
numbers are increasing. Still, the roots of the juvenile 
justice system remain strong and need to be supported 
by all those committed to improving the lives of our 
children. At OJJDP, we intend to continue our efforts 
to strengthen the juvenile justice system and achieve 





The juvenile justice system was founded on the 
concept of rehabilitation through individualized justice 
Early in U.S. history, children 
who broke the law were treated 
the same as adult criminals 
Throughout the late 18th century, 
"infants" below the age of reason 
(traditionally age 7) were presumed 
to be incapable of criminal intent 
and were, therefore, exempt from 
prosecution and punishment. Chil-
dren as young as 7, however, could 
stand trial in criminal court for of-
fenses committed and, if found 
guilty, could be sentenced to prison 
or even to death. 
The 19th-century movement that 
led to the establishment of the juve-
nile court in the U.S. had its roots in 
16th-century European educational 
2 
John Augustus-planting the 
seeds of juvenile probation 
(1847) 
"I bailed nineteen boys, from 7 to 15 
years of age, and in bailing them it 
was understood, and agreed by the 
court, that their cases should be 
continued from term to term for sev-
eral months, as a season of proba-
tion; thus each month at the calling 
of the docket, I would appear in 
court, make my report, and thus the 
cases would pass on for 5 or 6 
months. At the expiration of this 
term, twelve of the boys were 
brought into court at one time, and 
the scene formed a striking and 
highly pleasing contrast with their 
appearance when first arraigned. 
The judge expressed much plea-
sure as well as surprise at their ap-
pearance, and remarked, that the 
object of law had been accom-
plished and expressed his cordial 
approval of my plan to save and 
reform ." 
reform movements. These earlier re-
form movements changed the per-
ception of children from one of mini-
ature adults to one of persons with 
less than fully developed moral and 
cognitive capacities. 
As early as 1825, the Society for the 
Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency 
was advocating the separation of ju-
venile and adult offenders. Soon, fa-
cilities exclusively for juveniles 
were established in most major cit-
ies. By mid-century, these privately 
operated youth "prisons" were un-
der criticism for various abuses. 
Many States then took on the re-
sponsibility of operating juvenile 
facilities. 
The first juvenile court in this 
country was established in Cook 
County, Illinois, in 1899 
Illinois passed the Juvenile Court 
Act of 1899, which established the 
Nation's first juvenile court. The 
British doctrine of parens patriae 
(the State as parent) was the ratio-
nale for the right of the State to in-
tervene in the lives of children in a 
manner different from the way it in-
tervenes in the lives of adults. The 
doctrine was interpreted to mean 
that, because children were not of 
full legal capacity, the State had the 
inherent power and responsibility 
to provide protection for children 
whose natural parents were not pro-
viding appropriate care or supervi-
sion. A key element was the focus 
on the welfare of the child. Thus, 
the delinquent child was also seen 
as in need of the court's benevolent 
intervention. 
Juvenile courts flourished for the 
first half of the 20th century 
By 1910, 32 States had established 
juvenile courts and/or probation 
services. By 1925, all but two States 
had followed suit. Rather than 
merely punishing delinquents for 
their crimes, juvenile courts sought 
to turn delinquents into productive 
citizens-through treatment. 
The mission to help children in 
trouble was stated clearly in the 
laws that established juvenile 
courts. This benevolent mission led 
to procedural and substantive dif-
ferences between the juvenile and 
criminal justice systems. 
During the next 50 years, most juve-
nile courts had exclusive original 
jurisdiction over all youth under age 
18 who were charged with violating 
criminal laws. Only if the juvenile 
court waived its jurisdiction in a 
case could a child be transferred to 
criminal court and tried as an adult. 
Transfer decisions were made on a 
case-by-case basis using a "best 
interests of the child and public" 
standard, and were thus within the 
realm of individualized justice. 
The focus on offenders and not 
offenses, on rehabilitation and 
not punishment, had substantial 
procedural impact 
Unlike the criminal justice system, 
where district attorneys select 
cases for trial, the juvenile court 
controlled its own intake. And un-
like criminal prosecutors, juvenile 
court intake considered extra-legal 
as well as legal factors in deciding 
how to handle cases. Juvenile court 
intake also had discretion to handle 
cases informally, bypassing judicial 
action. 
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Some juvenile codes emphasize prevention and treatment goals, 
some stress punishment, and others seek a balanced approach 
Philosophical goals stated in juvenile code purpose clauses, 1997 
Prevention/ Both prevention/diversion/ 
diversion/treatment Punishment treatment and punishment 
Arizona* Arkansas Alabama Nevada 
Dist. of Columbia Georgia Alaska New Hampshire 
Kentucky Hawaii California New Jersey 
Massachusetts Illinois Colorado New Mexico 
North Carolina Iowa Connecticut New York 
Ohio Louisiana Delaware North Dakota 
South Carolina Michigan Florida Oklahoma 
Vermont Missouri Idaho Oregon 








• Most States seek to protect the interests of the child, the family, the com-
munity, or some combination of the three. 
• In 17 States, the purpose clause incorporates the language of the balanced 
and restorative justice philosophy, emphasizing offender accountability, pub-
lic safety, and competency development. 
• Purpose clauses also address court issues such as fairness, speedy trials, 
and even coordination of services. In nearly all States, the code also in-
cludes protections of the child's constitutional and statutory rights. 
*Arizona's statutes and court rules did not contain a purpose clause; however, the issue is 
addressed in case law. 
Source: Authors' adaptation ofTorbet and Szymanski's State legislative responses to vio-
lent juvenile crime: 1996- 97 update [unpublished background research]. 
In the courtroom, juvenile court 
hearings were much less formal 
than criminal court proceedings. In 
this benevolent com t-with the ex-
press purpose of protecting chil-
dren-due process protections af-
forded criminal defendants were 
deemed unnecessary. In the early ju-
venile courts, and even in some to 
this day, attorneys for the State and 
the youth are not considered essen-
tial to the operation of the system, 
especially in less serious cases. 
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A range of dispositional options was 
available to a judge wanting to help 
rehabilitate a child. Regardless of of-
fense, outcomes ranging from warn-
ings to probation supervision to 
training school confinement could 
be part of the treatment plan. 
Dispositions were tailored to "the 
best interests of the child ." Treat-
ment lasted until the child was 
"cured" or became an adult (age 
21), whichever came first. 
As public confidence in the 
treatment model waned, due 
process protections were 
introduced 
In the 1950's and 1960's, many came 
to question the ability of the juve-
nile court to succeed in rehabilitat-
ing delinquent youth. The treatment 
techniques available to juvenile jus-
tice professionals never reached the 
desired levels of effectiveness. Al-
though the goal of rehabilitation 
through individualized justice-the 
basic philosophy of the juvenile jus-
tice system-was not in question, 
professionals were concerned about 
the growing number of juveniles 
institutionalized indefinitely in the 
name of treatment. 
In a series of decisions beginning in 
the 1960's, the U.S. Supreme Court 
required that juvenile courts be-
come more formal-more like crimi-
nal courts. Formal hearings were 
now required in waiver situations, 
and delinquents facing possible con-
finement were given protection 
against self-incrimination and rights 
to receive notice of the charges 
against them, to present witnesses, 
to question witnesses, and to have 
an attorney. Proof "beyond a reason-
able doubt" rather than merely "a 
preponderance of evidence" was 
now required for an adjudication. 
The Supreme Court, however, still 
held that there were enough "differ-
ences of substance between the 
criminal and juvenile courts ... to 
hold that a jury is not required in 
the latter." (See Supreme Court deci-
sions later in this Bulletin.) 
Meanwhile Congress, in the Juvenile 
Delinquency Prevention and Control 
Act of 1968, recommended that chil-
dren charged with noncriminal (sta-
tus) offenses be handled outside 
the court system. A few years later, 
3 
Congress passed the Juvenile Jus-
tice and Delinquency Prevention Act 
of 1974, which as a condition for 
State participation in the Formula 
Grants program required deinstitu-
tionalization of status offenders and 
nonoffenders as well as the separa-
tion of juvenile delinquents from 
adult offenders. (In the 1980 amend-
ments to the 1974 Act, Congress 
added a requirement that juveniles 
be removed from adult jail and 
lockup facilities.) Community-based 
programs, diversion, and deinstitution-
alization became the banners of 
juvenile justice policy in the 1970's. 
In the 1980's, the pendulum began 
to swing toward law and order 
During the 1980's, the public per-
ceived that serious juvenile crime 
was increasing and that the system 
was too lenient with offenders. Al-
though there was substantial 
misperception regarding increases 
in juvenile crime, many States re-
sponded by passing more punitive 
laws. Some laws removed certain 
classes of offenders from the juve-
nile justice system and handled 
them as adult criminals in criminal 
court. Others required the juvenile 
justice system to be more like the 
criminal justice system and to treat 
certain classes of juvenile offenders 
as criminals but in juvenile court. 
As a result, offenders charged with 
certain offenses are excluded from 
juvenile court jurisdiction or face 
mandatory or automatic waiver to 
criminal court. In some States, con-
current jurisdiction provisions give 
prosecutors the discretion to file 
certain juvenile cases directly in 
criminal court rather than juvenile 
court. In some States, some adjudi-
cated juvenile offenders face manda-
tory sentences. 
4 
The core requirements of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act primarily address custody issues 
The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency • The "disproportionate confinement 
Prevention Act of 197 4, as amended, of minority youth" requirement 
(the Act) establishes four custody- (1992) specifies that States deter-
related requirements: mine the existence and extent of 
• The "deinstitutionalization of status the problem in their State and dem-
offenders and nonoffenders" require- onstrate efforts to reduce it where it 
ment (1974) specifies that juveniles exists. 
not charged with acts that would be Regulations effective December 10, 
crimes tor adults "shall not be 1996, modify the Act's requirements in 
placed in secure detention facilities several ways: 
or secure correctional facilities." • Clarity the sight and sound separa-
• The "sight and sound separation" tion requirement-in nonresidential 
requirement (1974) specifies that, areas brief, accidental contact is 
"juveniles alleged to be or found to not a reportable violation. 
be delinquent and [status offend- • Permit time-phased use of nonresi-
ers and nonoffenders] shall not be dential areas for both juveniles and 
detained or confined in any institu- adults in collocated facilities. 
tion in which they have contact 
with adult persons incarcerated 
because they have been convicted 
of a crime or are awaiting trial on 
criminal charges." This requires 
that juvenile and adult inmates 
cannot see each other and no con-
versation between them is possible. 
• The "jail and lockup removal" re-
quirement (1980} states that juve-
niles shall not be detained or con-
fined in adult jails or lockups. 
There are, however, several ex-
ceptions to the jail and lockup re-
moval requirement. Regulations 
implementing the Act exempt juve-
niles held in secure adult facilities 
if the juvenile is being tried as a 
criminal for a felony or has been 
convicted as a criminal felon. In 
addition, there is a 6-hour grace 
period that allows adult jails and 
lockups to hold delinquents tempo-
rarily until other arrangements can 
be made. Jails and lockups in rural 
areas may hold delinquents up to 
24 hours under certain conditions. 
Some jurisdictions have obtained 
approval for separate juvenile de-
tention centers that are collocated 
with an adult jail or lockup facility. 
• Expand the 6-hour grace period to 
include 6 hours both before and af-
ter court appearances. 
• Allow adjudicated delinquents to be 
transferred to adult institutions once 
they have reached the State's age 
of full criminal responsibility, where 
such transfer is expressly autho-
rized by State law. 
The revised regulations offer flexibility 
to States in carrying out the Act's re-
quirements. States must agree to com-
ply with each requirement to receive 
Formula Grants funds under the Act's 
provisions. States must submit plans 
outlining their strategy for meeting the 
requirements and other statutory plan 
requirements. Noncompliance with 
core requirements results in the loss of 
25% of the State's annual Formula 
Grants program allocation. 
As of 1998, 55 of 57 eligible States and 
territories are participating in the For-
mula Grants program. Annual State 
monitoring reports show that the vast 
majority are in compliance with the re-
quirements, either reporting no viola-
tions or meeting de minimis or other 
compliance criteria. 
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The 1990's have been a time of 
unprecedented change as State From 1992 through 1997, legislatures in 47 States and the District 
legislatures crack down on of Columbia enacted laws that made their juvenile justice systems 
juvenile crime more punitive 
Five areas of change have emerged Changes in Changes in 
as States passed laws designed to State law or court rule* State law or court rule* 
crack down on juvenile crime. These Alabama T c Montana T laws generally involve expanded eli- s c 
gibility for criminal court processing Alaska T c Nebraska 
and adult correctional sanctioning Arizona T s c Nevada T c 
and reduced confidentiality protec- Arkansas T s c New Hampshire T s c 
tions for a subset of juvenile offend- California T c New Jersey s c 
ers. Between 1992 and 1997, all but Colorado T s c New Mexico T s c 
three States changed laws in one or Connecticut T s c New York 
more of the following areas: Delaware T s c North Carolina T c 
• Transfer provisions-Laws made 
D. of Columbia T s North Dakota T c 
it easier to transfer juvenile of- Florida T s c Ohio T s c 
fenders from the juvenile justice Georgia T s c Oklahoma T s c 
system to the criminal justice Hawaii T c Oregon T s c 
system (45 States). Idaho T s c Pennsylvania T c 
• Sentencing authority-Laws gave 
Illinois T s c Rhode Island T s c 
criminal and juvenile courts ex- Indiana T s c South Carolina T c 
panded sentencing options (31 Iowa T s c South Dakota T 
States). Kansas T s c Tennessee T s c 
• Confidentiality-Laws modified 
Kentucky T s c Texas T s c 
or removed traditional juvenile Louisiana T s c Utah T c 
court confidentiality provisions Maine c Vermont 
by making records and proceed- Maryland T c Virginia T s c 
ings more open (47 States). Massachusetts T s c Washington T c 
Michigan s c West Virginia T c 
In addition to these areas, there was Minnesota T s c Wisconsin T s c 
change relating to: Mississippi T c Wyoming T c 
• Victims rights-Laws increased 
Missouri T s c 
the role of victims of juvenile *T =Transfer provisions, S = Sentencing authority, C = Confidentiality 
crime in the juvenile justice pro- Source: Authors' adaptation of Tarbet et al.'s State responses to serious and violent juve-
cess (22 States). nile crime and Tarbet and Szymanski's State legislative responses to violent juvenile crime: 
• Correctional programming-As 
1996-97 update. 
a result of new transfer and sen-
tencing laws, adult and juvenile tern and offender accountability, of- • Hold juveniles accountable for 
correctional administrators de- fender competency development, criminal behavior. 
veloped new programs. and community protection. Juvenile • Provide effective deterrents . code purpose clauses also incorpo-
• Protect the public from criminal The 1980's and 1990's have seen sig- rate restorative justice language (of-
nificant change in terms of treating fenders repair the harm done to vic-
activity. 
more juvenile offenders as crimi- tims and communities and accept • Balance attention to offenders, 
nals. Recently, States have been at- responsibility for their criminal ac- victims, and the community. 
tempting to strike a balance in their tions). Many States have added to • Impose punishment consistent juvenile justice systems among sys- the purpose clauses of their juvenile with the seriousness of the 
codes phrases such as: crime. 
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U.S. Supreme Court cases have had an impact on the 
character and procedures of the juvenile justice system 
The Supreme Court has made its 
mark on juvenile justice 
Issues arising from juvenile delin-
quency proceedings rarely come be-
fore the U.S. Supreme Court. Begin-
ning in the late 1960's, however, the 
Court decided a series of landmark 
cases that dramatically changed the 
character and procedures of the 
juvenile justice system. 
Kent v. United States 
383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045 (1966) 
In 1961, while on probation from an 
earlier case, Morris Kent, age 16, 
was charged with rape and robbery. 
Kent confessed to the offense as 
well as to several similar incidents. 
Assuming that the District of Colum-
bia juvenile court would consider 
waiving jurisdiction to the adult sys-
tem, Kent's attorney filed a motion 
requesting a hearing on the issue of 
jurisdiction. 
The juvenile court judge did not 
rule on this motion filed by Kent's 
attorney. Instead, he entered a mo-
tion stating that the court was waiv-
ing jurisdiction after making a "full 
investigation." The judge did not de-
scribe the investigation or the 
grounds for the waiver. Kent was 
subsequently found guilty in crim-
inal court on six counts of house-
breaking and robbery and sen-
tenced to 30 to 90 years in prison. 
Kent's lawyer sought to have the 
criminal indictment dismissed, argu-
ing that the waiver had been invalid. 
He also appealed the waiver and 
filed a writ of habeas corpus asking 
the State to justify Kent's detention. 
Appellate courts rejected both the 
appeal and the writ, refused to scru-
tinize the judge's "investigation," 
and accepted the waiver as valid. In 
appealing to the U.S. Supreme 
6 
Court, Kent's attorney argued that 
the judge had not made a complete 
investigation and that Kent was de-
nied constitutional rights simply be-
cause he was a minor. 
The Court ruled the waiver invalid, 
stating that Kent was entitled to a 
hearing that measured up to "the es-
sentials of due process and fair 
treatment," that Kent's counsel 
should have had access to all 
records involved in the waiver, and 
that the judge should have provided 
a written statement of the reasons 
for waiver. 
Technically, the Kent decision ap-
plied only to D.C. courts, but its im-
pact was more widespread. The 
Court raised a potential constitu-
tional challenge to parens patriae as 
the foundation of the juvenile court. 
In its past decisions, the Court had 
interpreted the equal protection 
clause of the 14th amendment to 
mean that certain classes of people 
could receive less due process if a 
"compensating benefit" came with 
this lesser protection. In theory, the 
juvenile court provided less due 
process but a greater concern for 
the interests of the juvenile. The 
Court referred to evidence that this 
compensating benefit may not exist 
in reality and that juveniles may re-
ceive the "worst of both worlds"-
"neither the protection accorded to 
adults nor the solicitous care and 
regenerative treatment postulated 
for children." 
In re Gault 
387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967) 
Gerald Gault, age 15, was on proba-
tion in Arizona for a minor property 
offense when, in 1964, he and a 
friend made a crank telephone call 
to an adult neighbor, asking her, 
"Are your cherries ripe today?" and 
"Do you have big bombers?" Identi-
fied by the neighbor, the youth were 
arrested and detained. 
The victim did not appear at the 
adjudication hearing, and the court 
never resolved the issue of whether 
Gault made the "obscene" remarks. 
Gault was committed to a training 
school for the period of his minor-
ity. The maximum sentence for an 
adult would have been a $50 fine or 
2 months in jail. 
An attorney obtained for Gault after 
the trial filed a writ of habeas cor-
pus that was eventually heard by 
the U.S. Supreme Court. The issue 
presented in the case was that 
Gault's constitutional rights (to no-
tice of charges, counsel, questioning 
of witnesses, protection against self-
incrimination, a transcript of the 
proceedings, and appellate review) 
were denied. 
The Court ruled that in hearings 
that could result in commitment to 
an institution, juveniles have the 
right to notice and counsel, to ques-
tion witnesses, and to protection 
against self-incrimination. The Court 
did not rule on a juvenile's right to 
appellate review or transcripts, but 
encouraged the States to provide 
those rights. 
The Court based its ruling on the 
fact that Gault was being punished 
rather than helped by the juvenile 
court. The Court explicitly rejected 
the doctrine of parens patriae as the 
founding principle of juvenile justice, 
describing the concept as murky and 
of dubious historical relevance. The 
Court concluded that the handling 
of Gault's case violated the due 
process clause of the 14th amend-
ment: "Juvenile court history has 
again demonstrated that unbridled 
discretion, however benevolently 
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motivated, is frequently a poor sub-
stitute for principle and procedure." 
In re Winship 
397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970) 
Samuel Winship, age 12, was 
charged with stealing $112 from a 
woman's purse in a store. A store 
employee claimed to have seen 
Winship running from the scene just 
before the woman noticed the 
money was missing; others in the 
store stated that the employee was 
not in a position to see the money 
being taken. 
Winship was adjudicated delinquent 
and committed to a training school. 
New York juvenile courts operated 
under the civil court standard of a 
"preponderance of evidence." The 
court agreed with Winship's attor-
ney that there was "reasonable 
doubt" of Winship's guilt, but based 
its ruling on the "preponderance" of 
evidence. 
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, 
the central issue in the case was 
whether "proof beyond a reason-
able doubt" should be considered 
among the "essentials of due pro-
cess and fair treatment" required 
during the adjudicatory stage of the 
juvenile court process. The Court 
rejected lower court arguments that 
juvenile courts were not required to 
operate on the same standards as 
adult courts because juvenile courts 
were designed to "save" rather than 
to "punish" children. The Court 
ruled that the "reasonable doubt" 
standard should be required in all 
delinquency adjudications. 
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania 
403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct.1976 (1971) 
Joseph McKeiver, age 16, was 
charged with robbery, larceny, and 
receiving stolen goods. He and 20 to 
30 other youth allegedly chased 3 
A series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions made juvenile courts more like criminal courts but maintained 
some important differences 
1965 
Breedv. Jones (1975) 
Kent v. United States ( 1966) 
Courts must provide the "essen-
tials of due process" in transferring 
juveniles to the adult system. 
Waiver of a juvenile to criminal court 
following adjudication in juvenile court 
constitutes double jeopardy. 
In re Gault ( 1967) 
In hearings that could result in commit-
ment to an institution, juveniles have 
four basic constitutional rights. 
In delinquency matters, the State 
must prove its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
1970 
Jury trials are not constitutionally 
required in juvenile court hearings. 
1975 
press may report juvenile court 
proceedings under certain circumstances. 
1980 
Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982)* 
Defendant's youthful age should be con-
sidered a mitigating factor in deciding 
whether to apply the death penalty. 
Schall v. Martin ( 1984) 
Preventive "pretrial" detention of 
juveniles is allowable under certain 
circumstances. 
1985 
Minimum age for death penalty 
is set at 16. 
1990 
*For discussion of death penalty case decisions, see page 211 of Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report. 
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youth and took 25 cents from them. 
McKeiver met with his attorney for 
only a few minutes before his adju-
dicatory hearing. At the hearing, his 
attorney's request for a jury trial 
was denied by the court. He was 
subsequently adjudicated and 
placed on probation. 
The State supreme court cited re-
cent decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court that had attempted to include 
more due process in juvenile court 
proceedings without eroding the es-
sential benefits of the juvenile court. 
The State supreme court affirmed 
the lower court, arguing that of all 
due process rights, trial by jury is 
most likely to "destroy the traditional 
character of juvenile proceedings." 
The U.S. Supreme Court found that 
the due process clause of the 14th 
amendment did not require jury tri-
als in juvenile court. The impact of 
the Court's Gault and Winship deci-
sions was to enhance the accuracy 
of the juvenile court process in the 
fact-finding stage. In McKeiver, the 
Court argued that juries are not 
known to be more accurate than 
judges in the adjudication stage and 
could be disruptive to the informal 
atmosphere of the juvenile court, 
tending to make it more adversarial. 
Breed v. Jones 
421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779 (1975) 
In 1970, Gary Jones, age 17, was 
charged with armed robbery. Jones 
appeared in Los Angeles juvenile 
court and was adjudicated delin-
quent on the original charge and 
two other robberies. 
At the dispositional hearing, the 
judge waived jurisdiction over the 
case to criminal court. Counsel for 
Jones filed a writ of habeas corpus, 
arguing that the waiver to criminal 
8 
court violated the double jeopardy 
clause of the fifth amendment. The 
court denied this petition, saying 
that Jones had not been tried twice 
because juvenile adjudication is not 
a "trial" and does not place a youth 
in jeopardy. 
Upon appeal, the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that an adjudication in 
juvenile court, in which a juvenile is 
found to have violated a criminal 
statute, is equivalent to a trial in 
criminal court. Thus, Jones had 
been placed in double jeopardy. The 
Court also specified that jeopardy 
applies at the adjudication hearing 
when evidence is first presented. 
Waiver cannot occur after jeopardy 
attaches. 
Oklahoma Publishing Company 
v. District Court in and for 
Oklahoma City 
480 U.S. 308, 97 S.Ct. 1 045 (1977) 
The Oklahoma Publishing Company 
case involved a court order prohib-
iting the press from reporting the 
name and photograph of a youth in-
volved in a juvenile court proceed-
ing. The material in question was 
obtained legally from a source out-
side the court. The U.S. Supreme 
Court found the court order to be 
an unconstitutional infringement on 
freedom of the press. 
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing 
Company 
443 U.S. 97, 99 S.Ct. 2667 (1979) 
The Daily Mail case held that State 
law cannot stop the press from pub-
lishing a juvenile's name that it ob-
tained independently of the court. 
Although the decision did not hold 
that the press should have access 
to juvenile court files, it held that if 
information regarding a juvenile 
case is lawfully obtained by the me-
dia, the first amendment interest in 
a free press takes precedence over 
the interests in preserving the ano-
nymity of juvenile defendants. 
Schall v. Martin 
467 U.S. 253, 104 S.Ct. 2403 (1984) 
Gregory Martin, age 14, was ar-
rested in 1977 and charged with rob-
bery, assault, and possession of a 
weapon. He and two other youth al-
legedly hit a boy on the head with a 
loaded gun and stole his jacket and 
sneakers. 
Martin was held pending adjudica-
tion because the court found there 
was a "serious risk" that he would 
commit another crime if released. 
Martin's attorney filed a habeas cor-
pus action challenging the funda-
mental fairness of preventive deten-
tion. The lower appellate courts 
reversed the juvenile court's deten-
tion order, arguing in part that pre-
trial detention is essentially punish-
ment because many juveniles 
detained before trial are released 
before, or immediately after, 
adjudication. 
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the preventive 
detention statute. The Court stated 
that preventive detention serves a 
legitimate State objective in protect-
ing both the juvenile and society 
from pretrial crime and is not in-
tended to punish the juvenile. The 
Court found there were enough pro-
cedures in place to protect juveniles 
from wrongful deprivation of liberty. 
The protections were provided by 
notice, a statement of the facts and 
reasons for detention, and a prob-
able cause hearing within a short 
time. The Court also reasserted the 
parens patriae interests of the State 
in promoting the welfare of children. 
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State statutes defiue who is under the jurisdiction of 
juvenile court 
State statutes define age limits 
for the original jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court 
In most States, the juvenile court 
has original jurisdiction over all 
youth charged with a law violation 
who were below the age of 18 at the 
time of the offense, arrest, or refer-
ral to court. Since 1975, four States 
have changed their age criteria: Ala-
bama increased its upper age from 
15 to 16 in 1976 and to 17 in 1977; 
Wyoming reduced its upper age 
from 18 to 17 in 1993; and New 
Hampshire and Wisconsin lowered 
their upper age from 17 to 16 in 
1996. 
Oldest age for original juvenile court ju-
risdiction in delinquency matters: 
Age State 
15 Connecticut, New York, North 
Carolina 
16 Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, 
New Hampshire, South Carolina, 
Texas, Wisconsin 
17 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkan-
sas, California, Colorado, Dela-
ware, District of Columbia, 
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, 
Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi , 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, 
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, 
West Virginia, Wyoming 
Many States have higher upper ages 
of juvenile court jurisdiction in sta-
tus offense, abuse, neglect, or de-
pendency matters-typically 
through age 20. 
In many States, the juvenile court 
has original jurisdiction over young 
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adults who committed offenses while 
juveniles . Many States exclude mar-
ried or otherwise emancipated juve-
niles from juvenile court jurisdiction. 
Many States have statutory excep-
tions to basic age criteria. The ex-
ceptions, related to the youth's age, 
alleged offense, and/or prior court 
history, place certain youth under 
the original jurisdiction of the crimi-
nal court. In some States, a combi-
nation of the youth's age, offense, 
and prior record places the youth 
under the original jurisdiction of 
both the juvenile and criminal 
courts. In these situations where ju-
venile and criminal courts have con-
current jurisdiction, the prosecutor 
has the authority to decide which 
court will initially handle the case. 
Statutes in 16 States determine 
the lowest age of juvenile court 
delinquency jurisdiction 
Youngest age for original juvenile court 
jurisdiction in delinquency matters: 
Age State 
6 North Carolina 
7 Maryland, Massachusetts, 
New York 
8 Arizona 
1 0 Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Pennsylvania, South Da-
kota, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin 
In most States, juvenile court 
authority over a youth may 
extend beyond the upper age 
of original jurisdiction 
Through extended jurisdiction 
mechanisms, legislatures enable the 
court to provide sanctions and ser-
vices for a duration of time that is in 
the best interests of the juvenile and 
the public, even for older juveniles 
who have reached the age at which 
original juvenile court jurisdiction 
ends . 
Oldest age over which the juvenile 
court may retain jurisdiction for disposi-
tion purposes in delinquency matters: 
Age State 
17 Arizona*, North Carolina 
18 Alaska, Iowa, Kentucky, Ne-
braska, Oklahoma, Tennessee 
19 Mississippi, North Dakota 
20 Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, 
Delaware, District of Columbia, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Ver-
mont, Virginia, Washington, West 
Virginia, Wyoming 
22 Kansas 
24 California, Montana, Oregon, Wis-
consin 
Colorado, Hawaii, New Jersey 
• Arizona statute extends jurisdiction through 
age 20, but a 1979 State Supreme Court de-
cision held that juvenile court jurisdiction ter-
minates at age 18. 
**Until the full term of the disposition order. 
Note: Extended jurisdiction may be restricted 
to certain offenses or juveniles. 
In some States, the juvenile court 
may impose adult correctional sanc-
tions on certain adjudicated delin-
quents that extend the term of con-
finement well beyond the upper age 
of juvenile jurisdiction. Such sen-
tencing options are included in the 
set of dispositional options known 
as "blended sentencing." 
9 
The juvenile justice system differs from the criminal 
justice system, but there is common ground 
The juvenile justice system 
grew out of the criminal 
justice system 
After working within the criminal 
justice system, designers of the 
juvenile justice system retained 
many of the components of the 
criminal justice system as they con-
structed a new process to respond 
to delinquent youth. An understand-
ing of what was retained and what 
was changed helps to make clear 
the basic differences between the 
two systems as they exist today. 
During its nearly 100-year history, 
the juvenile justice system in the 
U.S. has seen fundamental changes 
in certain aspects of process and 
philosophy. Recently, there has 
been some discussion about the 
possibility of essentially merging 
the juvenile and criminal systems. 
An understanding of similarities and 
differences between the two sys-
tems is valuable in assessing the 
implications of the proposed 
changes. 
Although the juvenile and criminal justice systems are more alike in some jurisdictions than in others, 
generalizations can be made about the distinctions between the two systems and about their common 
ground 
Juvenile justice system 
• Youth behavior is malleable. 
• Rehabilitation is usually a viable goal. 
• Youth are in families and not independent. 
• Many specific delinquency preven-
tion activities (e.g., school, church, 
recreation) are used. 
• Prevention is intended to change 
individual behavior and is often fo-
cused on reducing risk factors and 
increasing protective factors in the 
individual, family, and 
community. 
• Specialized "juvenile" units are 
used. 
• Some additional behaviors are 
prohibited (truancy, running away, 
curfew violations). 
• Some limitations are placed on 
public access to information. 
• A significant number of youth are 
diverted away from the juvenile 





• Community protection is a primary goal. 
• Law violators must be held accountable. 
• Constitutional rights apply. 
Prevention 
• Educational approaches are taken 
to specific behaviors (drunk driv-
ing, drug use). 
Law Enforcement 
• Jurisdiction involves the full range 
of criminal behavior. 
• Constitutional and procedural 
safeguards exist. 
• Both reactive and proactive ap-
proaches (targeted at offense 
types, neighborhoods, etc.) are 
used. 
• Community policing strategies are 
employed. 
I Criminal justice system 
• Sanctions should be proportional 
to the offense. 
• General deterrence works. 
• Rehabilitation is not a primary goal. 
• Prevention activities are general-
ized and are aimed at deterrence 
(e.g., Crime Watch). 
• Open public access to all informa-
tion is required. 
• Law enforcement exercises dis-
cretion to divert offenders out of 
the criminal justice system. 
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Juvenile justice system 
• In many instances, juvenile court 
intake, not the prosecutor, decides 
what cases to file. 
• The decision to file a petition for 
court action is based on both 
social and legal factors. 
• A significant portion of cases are 
diverted from formal case 
processing. 
• Intake or the prosecutor diverts 
cases from formal processing to 
services operated by the juvenile 
court, prosecutor's office, or out-
side agencies. 
• Juveniles may be detained for their 
own protection or the community's 
protection. 
• Juveniles may not be confined 
with adults unless there is "sight 
and sound separation." 
• Juvenile court proceedings are 
"quasi-civil" (not criminal) and may 
be confidential. 
• If guilt is established, the youth is 
adjudicated delinquent regardless 
of offense. 




• Probable cause must be 
established. 
• The prosecutor acts on behalf of 
the State. 
Detention-Jail/lockup 
• Accused offenders may be held in 
custody to ensure their appear-
ance in court. 
• Detention alternatives of home or 
electronic detention are used. 
Adjudication-Conviction 
• Standard of "proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubr is required. 
• Rights to be represented by an at-
torney, to confront witnesses, and 
to remain silent are afforded. 
• Appeals to a higher court are 
allowed. 
• Experimentation with specialized 
courts (i.e., drug courts, gun 
courts) is under way. 
• Plea bargaining is common . 
• The prosecution decision is based 
largely on legal facts. 
• Prosecution is valuable in building 
history for subsequent offenses. 
• Prosecution exercises discretion 
to withhold charges or divert of-
fenders out of the criminal justice 
system . 
• Accused individuals have the right 
to apply for bond/bail release. 
• Defendants have a constitutional 
right to a jury trial. 
• Guilt must be established on indi-
vidual offenses charged for 
conviction. 
• All proceedings are open . 
1 1 
Juvenile justice system 
• Disposition decisions are based 
on individual and social factors, 
offense severity, and youth's 
offense history. 
• Dispositional philosophy includes 
a significant rehabilitation 
component. 
• Many dispositional alternatives 
are operated by the juvenile court. 
• Dispositions cover a wide range of 
community-based and residential 
serv1ces. 
• Disposition orders may be di-
rected to people other than the of-
fender (e.g., parents). 
• Disposition may be indeterminate, 
based on progress demonstrated 
by the youth. 
• Function combines surveillance 
and reintegration activities (e.g., 
family, school, work). 
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Common ground 
Decisions are influenced by cur-
rent offense, offending history, and 
social factors. 
• Decisions hold offenders 
accountable. 
• Decisions may give consideration 
to victims (e.g., restitution and "no 
contact" orders). 
• Decisions may not be cruel or 
unusual. 
Aftercare-Parole 
• The behavior of individuals re-
leased from correctional settings is 
monitored. 
• Violation of conditions can result 
in reincarceration. 
Criminal justice system 
• Sentencing decisions are bound 
primarily by the severity of the cur-
rent offense and by the offender's 
criminal history. 
• Sentencing philosophy is based 
largely on proportionality and 
punishment. 
• Sentence is often determinate, 
based on offense. 
• Function is primarily surveillance 
and reporting to monitor illicit 
behavior. 
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All States allow juveniles to be tried as adults in 
criminal court under certain circumstances 
Transferring juveniles to criminal 
Most States have a combination of transfer provisions court is not a new phenomenon 
Once an 
adult/ 
In some States, provisions that en- Judicial waiver Concurrent Statutory Reverse always an 
abled transfer of certain juveniles to Discretionary Presumptive Mandatory jurisdiction exclusion waiver adult 
Total number 
criminal court were in place before of States: 46 15 14 15 28 23 31 
the 1920's. Other States have per-
mitted transfers since at least the Alabama • • • 1940's. For many years, all States Alaska • • • Arizona • • • • • • have had at least one provision for Arkansas • • • trying certain youth of juvenile age California • • • 
as adults in criminal court. Such Colorado • • • • Connecticut 
• • provisions are typically limited by Delaware • • • • • age and offense criteria. Transfer Dist. of Columbia • • • • 
mechanisms vary regarding where Florida • • • • Georgia • • • • • the responsibility for transfer deci- Hawaii • • 
sionmaking lies. Idaho • • • Illinois • • • • Indiana • • • • Transfer provisions fall into three Iowa • • • • general categories: Kansas • • • Kentucky • • • Louisiana • • • • Judicial waiver: The juvenile court Maine • • judge has the authority to waive ju- Maryland • • • Massachusetts • • venile court jurisdiction and trans- Michigan • • • fer the case to criminal court. States Minnesota • • • • 
may use terms other than judicial Mississippi • • • • Missouri • • waiver. Some call the process certifi- Montana • • • cation, remand, or bind over for Nebraska • • 
criminal prosecution. Others trans- Nevada • • • • • New Hampshire • • • fer or decline rather than waive New Jersey • • jurisdiction. New Mexico • New York • • North Carolina • • Concurrent jurisdiction: Original ju- North Dakota • • • • 
risdiction for certain cases is shared Ohio • • • 
by both criminal and juvenile Oklahoma • • • • • Oregon • • • • courts, and the prosecutor has dis- Pennsylvania • • • • • 
cretion to file such cases in either Rhode Island • • • • 
court. Transfer under concurrent ju- South Carolina • • • • South Dakota • • • • risdiction provisions is also known Tennessee • • • 
as prosecutorial waiver, prosecutor Texas • • Utah • • • • discretion, or direct file. Vermont • • • • Virginia • • • • • 
Statutory exclusion: State statute Washington • • • West Virginia • • excludes certain juvenile offenders Wisconsin • • • • from juvenile court jurisdiction. Un- Wyoming • • • 
der statutory exclusion provisions, • In States with a combination of transfer mechanisms, the exclusion, mandatory waiver, or concur-
cases originate in criminal rather rent jurisdiction provisions generally target the oldest juveniles and/or those charged with the most 
serious offenses, while those charged with relatively less serious offenses and/or younger juve-
than juvenile court. Statutory exclu- niles may be eligible for discretionary waiver. 
sion is also known as legislative Source: Authors' adaptation of Torbet and Szymanski's State legislative responses to violent juve-
exclusion. nile crime: 1996-97 update. 
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Many States have changed the 
boundaries of juvenile court 
jurisdiction 
Traditionally, discretionary judicial 
waiver was the transfer mechanism 
on which most States relied. Begin-
ning in the 1970's and continuing 
through the present, however, State 
legislatures have increasingly 
moved juvenile offenders into crimi-
nal court based on age and/or of-
fense seriousness, without the case-
specific consideration offered by 
the discretionary juvenile court ju-
dicial waiver process. 
State transfer provisions changed 
extensively in the 1990's. From 1992 
through 1997, all but six States en-
acted or expanded transfer provi-
sions. An increasing number of State 
legislatures have enacted manda-
tory waiver or exclusion statutes. 
Less common, then and now, are 
concurrent jurisdiction provisions. 
In most States, juveniles 
convicted in criminal court 
cannot be tried in juvenile court 
for subsequent offenses 
In 31 States, juveniles who have 
been tried as adults must be pros-
ecuted in criminal court for any sub-
sequent offenses. Nearly all of these 
14 
"once an adult/always an adult" pro-
visions require that the youth must 
have been convicted of the offenses 
that triggered the initial criminal 
prosecution. 
Judicial waiver is the most 
common transfer provision 
In all States except Nebraska, New 
Mexico, and New York, juvenile 
court judges may waive jurisdiction 
over certain cases and transfer 
them to criminal court. Such action 
is usually in response to a request 
by the prosecutor; in several States, 
however, juveniles or their parents 
may request judicial waiver. In most 
States, statutes limit waiver by age 
and offense. 
Waiver provisions vary in terms of 
the degree of decisionmaking flex-
ibility allowed. Under some waiver 
provisions, the decision is entirely 
discretionary. Under others, there is 
a rebuttable presumption in favor of 
waiver. Under others, waiver is man-
datory once the juvenile court judge 
determines that certain statutory 
criteria have been met. Mandatory 
waiver provisions are distinguished 
from statutory exclusion provisions 
in that the case originates in juve-
nile rather than criminal court. 
Statutes establish waiver criteria 
other than age and offense 
In some States, waiver provisions 
target youth charged with offenses 
involving firearms or other weap-
ons. Most State statutes also limit 
judicial waiver to juveniles who are 
"no longer amenable to treatment." 
The specific factors that determine 
lack of amenability vary, but typi-
cally include the juvenile's offense 
history and previous dispositional 
outcomes. Such amenability criteria 
are generally not included in statu-
tory exclusion or concurrent juris-
diction provisions. 
Many statutes instruct juvenile 
courts to consider other factors 
when making waiver decisions, such 
as the availability of dispositional al-
ternatives for treating the juvenile, 
the time available for sanctions, 
public safety, and the best interests 
of the child. The waiver process 
must also adhere to certain consti-
tutional principles of fairness (see 
Supreme Court decisions earlier in 
this Bulletin). 
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In most States, juvenile court judges can waive juvenile court jurisdiction over certain cases and 
transfer them to criminal court 
Minimum Judicial waiver offense and minimum age criteria, 1997 
age for Any Certain Certain Certain Certain 
judicial criminal Certain Capital person property drug weapon 
State waiver offense felonies crimes Murder offenses offenses offenses offenses 
Alabama 14 
-
Alaska NS B1l llmJI 
Arizona NS 
Arkansas 14 .. IIIII 
California 14 .. .. IIIII 
Colorado 12 
Connecticut 14 .. 
Delaware NS It I 011 10'1 Dis!. of Columbia NS ... tm1l 
Florida 14 
Georgia 13 .. 11m 
Hawaii NS llmJI 
Idaho NS llmJI B1l llmJI 
Illinois 13 




Kentucky 14 .. 
Louisiana 14 .. IIIII 
Maine NS llmJI llmJI 
Maryland NS .. llmJI 
Michigan 14 
-
Minnesota 14 .. 
Mississippi 13 
Missouri 12 Ell 
Montana NS llmJI 
Nevada 14 .. .. .. 
New Hampshire 13 
-
IIIII IIIII .. 
New Jersey 14 ... .. .. .. IIDI .. 
North Carolina 13 
North Dakota 14 
-
.. IIIII 
Ohio 14 .. .. .. 
Oklahoma NS 
Oregon NS llmJI .. 
Pennsylvania 14 .. 
Rhode Island NS IIIII 
South Carolina NS 
-
llmJI IIIII .. 




Texas 14 .. .. 
Utah 14 .. .. IDII Ell 
Vermont 10 .. .. .. 
Virginia 14 1101 .. .. 
Washington NS or. 
West Virginia NS II llmJI mil llmJI Wisconsin 14 
-
.. IIIII IIIII 
Wyoming 13 .. 
Examples: Alabama allows waiver for any delinquency (criminal) offense involving a juvenile age 14 or older. Arizona allows waiver for any ju-
venile charged with a felony. New Jersey allows waiver for juveniles age 14 or older who are charged with murder or certain person, property, 
drug, or weapon offenses. In New Jersey, juveniles age 14 or older who have prior adjudications or convictions for certain offenses can be 
waived regardless of the current offense. 
Note: Ages in minimum age column may not apply to all offense restrictions, but represent the youngest possible age at which a juvenile may 
be judicially waived to criminal court. "NS" indicates that in at least one of the offense restrictions indicated, no minimum age is specified. 
aonly if committed while escaping from specified juvenile facilities. bRequires prior adjudication(s) or conviction(s), which may be 
conly if committed while in custody. required to have been for the same or a more serious offense type. 
Sources: Authors' adaptation of Griffin et al .'s Trying juveniles as adults in criminal court: An analysis of State transfer provisions. 
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Few States allow prosecutorial 
discretion, but many juveniles 
are tried as adults in this way 
As of the end of the 1997 legislative 
session, 15 States had concurrent 
jurisdiction provisions, which gave 
both juvenile court and criminal 
court original jurisdiction in certain 
cases. Thus, prosecutors have dis-
cretion to file such cases in either 
court. 
State appellate courts have taken 
the view that prosecutor discretion 
is equivalent to the routine charg-
ing decisions made in criminal 
cases. Thus, prosecutorial transfer 
is considered an "executive func-
tion," which is not subject to judi-
cial review and is not required to 
meet the due process standards 
established in Kent. Some States, 
however, have written prosecutorial 
transfer guidelines. 
Concurrent jurisdiction is typically 
limited by age and offense criteria. 
Often concurrent jurisdiction is lim-
ited to cases involving serious, vio-
lent, or repeat crimes or offenses in-
volving firearms or other weapons. 
Juvenile and criminal courts often 
also share Jurisdiction over minor 
offenses such as traffic, watercraft, 
or local ordinance violations. 
There are no national data at the 
present time on the number of juve-
nile cases tried in criminal court un-
der concurrent jurisdiction provi-
sions. Florida alone reports an 
average of nearly 5,000 such trans-
fers per year. 
In States with concurrent jurisdiction, the prosecutor has discretion to file certain cases, generally 
involving juveniles charged with serious offenses, in either criminal court or juvenile court 
Minimum Concurrent jurisdiction offense and minimum age criteria, 1997 
age for Any Certain Certain Certain Certain 
concurrent criminal Certain Capital person property drug weapon 
State jurisdiction offense felonies crimes Murder offenses offenses offenses offenses 
Arizona 14 .. 
Arkansas 14 .. .. .. .. .. 
Colorado 14 .. .. .. .. 
Dist. of Columbia 16 .. .. Ell 
Florida NS .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Georgia NS lmll 
Louisiana 15 .. .. .. .. 
Massachusetts 14 .. .. 
Michigan 14 .. .. .. .. .. 
Montana 12 .. .. .. .. 
Nebraska NS .. lmll 
Oklahoma 15 .. .. .. .. .. 
Vermont 16 .. 
Virginia 14 .. .. 
Wyoming 14 .. .. 
Examples: In Arizona, prosecutors have discretion to file directly in criminal court those cases involving juveniles age 14 or older charged 
with certain felonies (defined in State statutes). In Florida, prosecutors may "direct file" cases involving juveniles age 16 or older charged 
with a misdemeanor (if they have a prior adjudication) or a felony offense, as well as those age 14 or older charge1d with murder or certain 
person, property, or weapon offenses; no minimum age is specified for cases in which a grand jury indicts a juvenile for a capital offense. 
Note: Ages in minimum age column may not apply to all offense restrictions, but represent the youngest possible age at which a juvenile 
may be filed directly in criminal court. "NS" indicates that in at least one of the offense restrictions indicated, no minimum age is specified. 
aApplies to misdemeanors and requires prior adjudication(s), which may be bRequires grand jury indictment. 
required to have been for the same or a more serious offense type. cApplies to misdemeanors. 
Source: Authors' adaptation of Griffin eta I.'s Trying juveniles as adults in criminal court: An analysis of State transfer provisions. 
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Statutory exclusion accounts for 
the largest number of juveniles 
tried as adults in criminal court 
Legislatures "transfer" large num-
bers of young offenders to criminal 
court by enacting statutes that ex-
clude certain cases from juvenile 
court jurisdiction. As of the end of 
the 19971egislative session, 28 
States had statutory exclusions. Al-
though not typically thought of as 
transfers, large numbers of youth 
under age 18 are tried as adults in 
the 13 States where the upper age of 
juvenile court jurisdiction is 15 or 
16. If the 1.8 million 16- and 17-year-
olds in these 13 States are referred 
to criminal court at the same rate 
that 16- and 17-year-olds are re-
ferred to juvenile court in other 
States, then as many as 218,000 
cases involving youth under the age 
of 18 could have faced trial in crimi-
nal court in 1996 because the offend-
ers were defined as adults under 
State laws. 
Many States exclude certain serious 
offenses from juvenile court juris-
diction. State laws typically also set 
age limits for excluded offenses. 
The offenses most often excluded 
are capital crimes and murders, and 
other serious offenses against per-
sons. Some States exclude juveniles 
charged with felonies if they have 
prior felony adjudications or convic-
tions. Minor offenses, such as traf-
fic, watercraft, fish, or game viola-
tions, are often excluded from 
juvenile court jurisdiction in States 
where they are not covered by con-
current jurisdiction provisions. 
Criminal courts may transfer 
cases to Juvenile court or order 
juvenile sanctions 
Of the 35 States with statutory ex-
clusion or concurrent jurisdiction 
provisions, 20 also have provisions 
for transferring "excluded" or "di-
rect filed" cases from criminal court 
to juvenile court under certain cir-
cumstances. This procedure is 
sometimes referred to as "reverse" 
waiver or transfer. In some States, 
juveniles tried as adults in criminal 
court may be transferred to juvenile 
court for disposition. Some States 
allow juveniles tried as adults in 
criminal court to receive disposi-
tions involving either criminal or ju-
venile court sanctions, under what 
have come to be known as "blended 
sentencing" provisions. 
In most States, no minimum age is specified in at least one judicial waiver, concurrent jurisdiction, or 
statutory exclusion provision for transferring juveniles to criminal court 
Minimum transfer age indicated in section(s) of juvenile code specifying transfer provisions, 1997 













Nevada* Kansas Colorado Illinois Alabama 
Oklahoma* Vermont Missouri Mississippi Arkansas 
Oregon* Montana New Hampshire California 
Pennsylvania New York Connecticut 
Rhode Island North Carolina Iowa 
South Carolina Wyoming Kentucky 
South Dakota Louisiana 
Tennessee Massachusetts 
Washington* Michigan 
West Virginia Minnesota 








*Other sections of State statute specify an age below which children cannot be tried in criminal court. This minimum age for criminal respon-
sibility is 14 in Idaho, 12 in Georgia, 8 in Nevada and Washington, and 7 in Oklahoma. In Washington , 8- to 12-year-olds are presumed to be 
incapable of committing a crime. In Oklahoma, in cases involving 7- to 14-year-olds, the State must prove that at the time of the act, the child 
knew it was wrong . 
Source: Authors' adaptation of Griffin et al .'s Trying juveniles as adults in criminal court: An analysis of State transfer provisions. 
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In States with statutory exclusion provisions, certain cases involving juveniles originate in criminal 
court rather than juvenile court 
Minimum Statutory exclusion offense and minimum age criteria, 1997 
age for Any Certain Certain Certain Certain 
statutory criminal Certain Capital person property drug weapon 
State exclusion offense felonies crimes Murder offenses offenses offenses offenses 
Alabama 16 .. .. Ell 
Alaska 16 .. .. 
Arizona 15 IIIII .. .. 
Delaware 15 .. 
Florida NS &'11 ... 
Georgia 13 Ell Ell 
Idaho 14 IIIII IIIII IIIII IIIII 
Illinois 13 IIIII Ell .. .. .. 
Indiana 16 .. .. .. .. Ell 
Iowa 16 .. .. .. 
Louisiana 15 .. .. 
Maryland 14 .. .. .. .. 
Massachusetts 14 .. 
Minnesota 16 .. 
Mississippi 13 .. .. 
Montana 17 .. .. .. .. 
Nevada NS &II .. 11111 
New Mexico 15 .. 
New York 13 .. .. .. 
Oklahoma 13 
Oregon 15 .. .. 
Pennsylvania NS .. .. 
South Carolina 16 .. 
South Dakota 16 .. 
Utah 16 EEl .. 
Vermont 14 IIIII IIIII IIIII 
Washington 16 .. .. .. 
Wisconsin NS .. .. 
Examples: In Delaware, juveniles age 15 or older charged with certain felonies must be tried as adults. In Arizona, juveniles age 15 or older 
must be tried as adults if they are charged with murder or certain person offenses or .they have prior felony adjudications and are charged with 
a felony. 
Note: Ages in minimum age column may not apply to all offense restrictions, but represent the youngest possible age at which a juvenile 
may be excluded from juvenile court. "NS" indicates that in at least one of the offense restrictions indicated, no minimum age is specified. 
a Requires prior adjudication(s) or conviction(s), which may be required to have been for the same or a more serious offense type. 
bonly escape or bail violation while subject to prosecution in criminal court. dRequires prior commitment in a secure facility. 
cRequires grand jury indictment. 8 0nly if charged while confined or on probation or parole. 
Sources: Authors' adaptation of Griffin et al.'s Trying juveniles as adults in criminal court: An analysis of State transfer provisions. 
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New laws have had a dramatic impact on sentencing 
for serious or violent juvenile offenders 
A trend away from traditional 
juvenile dispositions is emerging 
Juvenile court dispositions were tra-
ditionally based on the offender's in-
dividual characteristics and situa-
tion. Dispositions were frequently 
indeterminate and generally had re-
habilitation as a primary goal. As 
many States have shifted the pur-
pose of juvenile court away from re-
habilitation and toward punishment, 
accountability, and public safety, the 
emerging trend is toward disposi-
tions based more on the offense 
than the offender. Offense-based 
dispositions tend to be determinate 
and proportional to the offense; ret-
ribution and deterrence replace re-
habilitation as the primary goal. 
Many State legislatures have 
changed disposition and 
sentencing options 
From 1992 through 1997, statutes re-
quiring mandatory minimum peri-
ods of incarceration for certain vio-
lent or serious offenders were added 
or modified in 16 States. 
States have also raised the maxi-
mum age of the ju_venile court's con-
tinuing jurisdiction over juvenile of-
fenders. Such laws allow juvenile 
courts to order dispositions that ex-
tend beyond the upper age of origi-
nal jurisdiction, most often to age 
21. From 1992 through 1997, 17 
States extended their age limit for 
delinquency dispositions. 
Perhaps the most dramatic change 
will result from "blended sentences." 
Blended sentencing statutes, which 
allow courts to impose juvenile and/ 
or adult correctional sanctions on 
certain young offenders, were in 
place in 20 States at the end of 1997. 
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Blended sentencing options create a "middle ground" between 
traditional juvenile sanctions and adult sanctions 
Blended sentencing option 
Juvenile-exclusive blend: The juvenile court may impose 
a sanction involving either the juvenile or adult correctional 
systems. 
~Juvenile 
Juvenile court  
Adult 
Juvenile-inclusive blend: The juvenile court may impose 
both juvenile and adult correctional sanctions. The adult 
sanction is suspended pending a violation and revocation. 
~Juvenile 
Juvenile court  
Adult 
Juvenile-contiguous blend: The juvenile court may 
impose a juvenile correctional sanction that may remain 
in force after the offender is beyond the age of the court's 
extended jurisdiction, at which point the offender may be 
transferred to the adult correctional system. 
Juvenile court -- Juvenile - Adult 
Criminal-exclusive blend: The criminal court may impose 
a sanction involving either the juvenile or adult correctional 
systems. Juvenile 
Criminal court ~ 
Adult 
Criminal-Inclusive blend: The criminal court may impose 
both juvenile and adult correctional sanctions. The adult 
sanction is suspended, but is reinstated if the terms of the 




Note: Blends apply to a subset of juveniles specified by State statute. 
1Applies to those designated as "aggravated juvenile offenders." 
2Applies to those designated as "youthful offenders." 
























Source: Authors' adaptation of Tarbet and Szymanski's State legislative responses to 
violent juvenile crime: 1996-97 update. 
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Information for this Bulletin was taken from chapter 4 
of Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National 
Report. For a full listing of sources for this chapter, 
see page 109 of the National Report. 
Resources 
Answers to frequently asked questions about juvenile 
justice statistics as well as periodic updates of data 
presented in Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 
National Report are available on the Internet in the 
OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book, which can be accessed 
through the OJJDP home page at www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org 
through the JJ Facts & Figures prompt. 
HOW To GET YOUR FREE COPY 
Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report 
(NCJ 178257) is available online from the OJJDP Web 
site (www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org) under the JJ Facts & Figures 
section and the Publications section or can be ordered 
from OJJDP's Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse. Send an 
e-mail to puborder@ncjrs.org; call 800-638-8736 (select 
option 2): or write to the Juvenile Justice Clearing-
house, P.O. Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20849-6000. Be 
sure to ask for NCJ 178257. 
NCJ 178995 
For information on OJJDP 
initiatives related to the reduction 
of juvenile crime, violence, and 
victimization, contact the Juvenile 
Justice Clearinghouse (JJC) at 
www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org or call 800-638-8736. 
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